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FROM WRONGDOING TO IMPRISONMENT: TEST OF A CAUSAL-MORAL MODEL
Ramadhar SINGH, Joseph J.P. SIMONS, William T. SELF, Philip E. TETLOCK, Paul A. BELL, James MAY, Richard J. CRISP,
Susheel KAUR, Jacob A. BENFIELD and William J. SZIEMKOWhen people learn of a wrongdoing, they
intuitively desire that the wrongdoer be
somehow punished. Why? According to the
model of intuitive prosecutors, wrongdoings
signal threats to the normative order that
must be eliminated through punishment.
Between the awareness of wrongdoing and
the punishment meted out, causal
attribution, anger, blame and punishment
goals of retribution (i.e., making the
offender atone for the harm done) and
deterrence (i.e., preventing future harm in
the society) intervene. How and in which
order do causal attribution and blame
transmit the effects of causal variables of
culture, circumstance of wrongdoing and
severity of outcome on punishment? Theauthors tested a causal-moral model of
punishment in which dispositional
attribution leads to blame which, in turn,
determines imprisonment. Specifically,
whereas severity of outcome impacts
punishment directly, circumstances of the
crime and the culture of the observers
impact punishment through dispositional
attribution and blame, respectively.
Singaporeans and Americans read about
a crime that (a) was committed
intentionally or under an extenuating
circumstance and (b) had low or severe
outcome for the victim. Participants made
dispositional attribution to, assigned blame
to, and recommended imprisonment for the
offender. Results supported the causal-moral path model that specified a direct
effect of severity of outcome, an indirect
effect of country via blame, and the
indirect effects of circumstance via
dispositional attribution to blame on
imprisonment but rejected two alternative
path models. Findings provided a new
perspective on (a) why the same action that
is construed as right in one culture is
construed as wrong (or less right) in another
culture and (b) the understanding of whistle
blowing. In particular, those who highlight
wrongdoings by government, management
and outsourcing agencies in the media are
intuitive prosecutors driven by the goal of
upholding normative order, not trouble-
makers seeking mere pleasure.DETERMINING EXPECTED BEHAVIOUR OF FRAUDSTERS FOR A CONTINUOUS AUDIT SYSTEM
Mathew A. THOMAS and Rahul R. MARATHEManagements and external auditors are
expected to assess and evaluate controls
that prevent and detect fraud. A key part
of this assessment is determination of
fraudeprone areas and the determination
of those systems or sub systems that are
susceptible to fraud. There are several
approaches that are used to find such
areas. In this research, we attempt to
model the behaviour of fraudsters in order
to help determine systems that require
close monitoring. We attempt todetermine the behaviour of fraudsters in
a continuous audit system and where the
fraudsters have multiple options for
committing fraud. The system is modelled
as a Continuous Time Markov Chain where
the state changes are caused by the
fraudster’s actions. In each state the
fraudster can either choose to continue
the fraud or to resign. The possibility of
success in each case is assumed to be
probabilistic. This state of affairs is
represented as a dynamic game withprobabilistic transitions. Since the
fraudster assumes that the audit system is
a rational player who seeks to minimise
the fraudster’s expected payoff, the Nash
Equilibrium of the complete stochastic
game is calculated. The Nash Equilibrium
is a set of minimax vectors. These solution
vectors represent a complete fraud
strategy, which maximises the expected
payoff of the fraudster and ensures that
she has no ex-post regrets.
